ABSTRACT: Several recent authors have suggested that, in cases where a speaker’s communicative intentions are not specific enough to determine a single proposition, we should think of a speaker as putting forward a _cloud_ of propositions. This "putting forward" is supposed to be an illocutionary act, distinct from asserting each of the propositions in the cloud. How can we characterize the force of this speech act? What norms govern it? How does it affect the common ground? How does it function in communication? What is required for "uptake"? The standard stories about these things all presuppose that the content of an assertion is a single proposition, so any proponent of the cloudy picture owes us a new story. I argue that none of the proponents of proposition clouds has given an adequate answer to these questions. Instead of solving the problem of contextual indeterminacy by introducing novel speech acts whose contents are clouds of propositions, I propose, we should solve it by modifying our conception of propositions and adopting a form of expressivism.