Sensible Individuation and Over-Determination

I begin with the controversial assumption that all sensory experiences present us with instances of sensible qualities. When I look out my window, I do not just see redness, I see *that cardinal’s redness*. When I hallucinate a red cardinal, then too, I am aware of a particular instance of redness. The mystery, however, is how I can be aware of an instance of redness in a hallucination if there is no physical object I am seeing which is red. Answering this question requires us to think more carefully about the nature of sensible qualities. First, I suggest that we should think of sensible qualities as *ontologically flexible* kinds: that is, they are kinds that can have both material and mind-dependent instances. If both a mind and a material object can be involved in the instantiation of a sensible quality, what should we then say about a case in which both instantiation relations simultaneously obtain? More specifically, can both a mind and a material object secure the existence of one and the same instance? I begin to develop a criterion of individuation for quality instances, according to which such *over-determined* instances are indeed possible, but only in cases in which the mind and the material object that support the instance are themselves intimately related.