Counterpossible Triviality, Potentiality, and Actuality

Counterfactual conditionals are closely connected to scientifically important things in the actual world: causation, dispositions, and scientific explanation. The standard semantics for counterfactuals requires us to evaluate what happens at possible worlds where their antecedents are true. Trouble arises when we consider counterpossibles (counterfactuals whose antecedents are impossible). On the standard semantics, they come out as trivially true. Yet some counterpossibles express non-trivial scientific truths about the world around us, and others express non-trivial scientific falsehoods. The trouble is even worse on certain "hardcore actualist" theories, which entail that metaphysical impossibilities are even more common than commonly assumed.

I argue that two particular strategies, appeal to impossible worlds and the re-interpretation of predicates and singular terms, provide the most promising way out of this puzzle for the hardcore actualist. They allow us to assign non-trivial truth values to counterpossibles, but also, when interpreted correctly, they allow counterpossibles to express truths about the metaphysical (not just epistemic) possibilities inherent in our universe.