Research

 

Click here for a full CV


Publications (click for links)


“Responsibility, Rational Abilities, and Two Kinds of Fairness Arguments,” in Philosophical Explorations (Special Issue: Action, Responsibility, and Belief) (2009).


Responsibility and Rational Abilities: Defending an Asymmetrical View,” in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2008).


Do We Have a Coherent Set of Intuitions About Moral Responsibility?,” in Philosophy and the Empirical, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31. (2007)


Good Luck to Libertarians: Reflections on Al Mele’s Free Will and Luck,Philosophical Explorations 10 (2007): 173-84.  (with a reply by Mele in the same issue)


Discriminating Shoppers Beware,” in San Diego Law Review (2006).


Tradition and the Law: A Response to Wax,” San Diego Law Review 42 (2005). 


Deliberative Alternatives,” in Philosophical Topics (on Agency).  (2004, appeared in 2005). [pdf of draft]


Freedom, Responsibility, and the Challenge of Situationism,” in Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29.  Cambridge: Blackwell. (2005).


Irrelevant Alternatives and Frankfurt Counterfactuals,” Philosophical Studies 121 (2004): 1-25.


“The Sense of Freedom,” in Freedom and Determinism, Volume II, Topics in Contemporary Philosophy.  Edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier.  Cambridge: MIT Press. (2004): 105-134.


“Moral Luck,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/moral-luck/.


Self-Deception, Motivation, and the Desire to Believe,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (2002): 384-406.


Warfield’s New Argument for Incompatibilism” (with Samuel C. Rickless), Analysis (2002): 104-07.


Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality: Comment on Charles Siewert’s The Significance of Consciousness,Psyche: An Interdisiplinary Journal of Research on Consciousness, (2001).


The Consequence Argument and the Mind Argument,Analysis 61 (2001): 107-15.


How to Solve Blum’s Paradox” (with Samuel C. Rickless), Analysis 61 (2001): 91-94.


The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality,” The Philosophical Review 109 (2000): 373-409.


Two Standpoints and the Belief in Freedom,” Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 564-76.