Draft of 1-8-04
PHIL 202: Ethics Core Course
Winter 2004; David O. Brink
Topic: Practical Reason
Syllabus
This is a list of possible topics and readings, which we can, and may
need to, adapt to our interests. Required readings are drawn from
the required texts and from additional material that will be on reserve
in the Philosophy Library (H&SS 8025). Readings are either (a)
required or (b) recommended. Within a topic, do the (required) readings
in the order in which they are listed. Especially recommended readings
are indicated with an asterisk. Full references can be found on the
Bibliography. If you have trouble locating recommended readings,
let me know, as I may be able to help (e.g. lend a copy).
I. BACKGROUND
1. Normative Adequacy, Intrapersonal/Interpersonal Contexts,
and Reason-Value Links
-
(B) Moore, Principia Ethica, sects. 1-23, 58-65; Rosati, “Naturalism,
Normativity, and the Open Question Argument”; Darwall, Impartial Reason;
*Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, “Toward Fin de Siecle Ethics”; Korsgaard,
The
Sources of Normativity; Tiffany, “The Unity of Reason”.
II. INTRAPERSONAL PRACTICAL REASON
2. Instrumentalism, Internalism, and Desiderative Conceptions
of Practical Reason
-
(A) Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, II.iii.3, III.i.1; Williams,
“Internal and External Reasons”.
-
(B) Cohon, “Are External Reasons Impossible?”; *Korsgaard, “Skepticism
about Practical Reason”; and *Tiffany, “Alienation and Internal Reasons
for Action”.
3. Desiderative Conceptions of Personal Good
-
(A) Mill, Utilitarianism ch. ii, paras. 1-6; Railton, “Facts
and Values”; Wiggins, “A Sensible Subjectivism?”
-
(B) *Kraut, “Two Conceptions of Happiness” and "Desire and the Human
Good"; Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, bk. I, ch. ix; Firth, “Ethical
Absolutism and the Ideal Observer Theory”; *Brandt, A Theory of the
Good and the Right, chs. 4-8; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, ch.
7; Lewis, “Dispositional Theories of Value”; McDowell, “Values and Secondary
Qualities”; Sturgeon, “Brandt’s Moral Empiricism”; Griffin, Well-Being;
Sobel, “Full Information Accounts of the Good”; Rosati, "Internalism and
the Good for a Person" and “Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information
Theories of the Good”; Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, p. 20;
Darwall, “Self-Interest and Self-Concern”; Sumner, Welfare, Happiness,
and Ethics; *Arneson, “Human Flourishing versus Desire Satisfaction”.
4. The Authority of Desire and Normative Perfectionism
-
(A) Stampe, “The Authority of Desire” and Brink, “The Significance of Desire”.
-
(B) Anscombe, Intention, p. 56; Humberstone, “Directions of Fit”;
Velleman, “The Guise of the Good”; Smith, The Moral Problem, ch.
4; Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, ch. 1; *Aristotle, De
Anima bk. ii and Nicomachena Ethics, bk. i, ch. 7; *Kant, Groundwork
for the Metaphysics of Morals, §§1-2; *Green, Prolegomena
to Ethics, bks. II-III; Hurka, Perfectionism; Kitcher, “Essence
and Perfection”; *Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, chs. 1-4;
Darwall, “Because I Want It”.
5. Prudence and Temporal Neutrality: The Structural Issue
-
(A) Parfit, Reasons and Persons, ch. 7 and Brink, “Rational Egoism
and the Separateness of Persons”.
-
(B) *Sidgwick, Methods IV 2 and Concluding Chapter; *Nagel, The
Possibility of Altruism, esp. chs. 5-12.
6. Prudence and Temporal Neutrality: Asymmetrical Attitudes toward
the Future and Past
-
(A) Parfit, Reasons and Persons, ch. 8.
-
(B) *Lucretius, De Rerum Natura iii 830-51, 972-77; Nagel, “Death”;
*Mitsis, “Epicurus on Death and the Duration of Life”.
7. Prudence and Temporal Neutrality: The Problem of Authenticity
-
(A) Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, pp. 73-74; Parfit, Reasons
and Persons, §§60, 110; and Brink, “Prudence and Authenticity”.
8. Prudence and Temporal Neutrality: Psychological Reductionism
about Personal Identity
-
(A) Parfit, Reasons and Persons, part III, esp. chs. 10-12, 14 and
Brink, “Rational Egoism and the Separateness of Persons”.
III. INTERPERSONAL PRACTICAL REASON
9. A Puzzle about Moral Motivation
-
(A) Stevenson, “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms”; Foot, “Morality
as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives”; Nagel, The Possibility of
Altruism; McDowell, “Virtue and Reason”.
-
(B) *Smith, The Moral Problem and Brink, “Moral Motivation”.
10. A Puzzle about the Authority of Morality
11. Relativist and Anti-Rationalist Solutions
-
(A) Harman, “Moral Relativism Defended” and Foot, “Morality as a System
of Hypothetical Imperatives”
-
(B) Plato, Gorgias; Hobbes, Leviathan, chs. xiii-xvii; Axelrod,
The
Evolution of Cooperation; and Gauthier, Morals by Agreement;
Foot, “Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?” and Natural Goodness.
12. Nagel and the Possibility of Altruism
-
(A) Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism.
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(B) Sturgeon, “Altruism, Solipsism, and the Objectivity of Reasons”; Darwall,
Impartial Reason, ch. 10.
13. Kantian Impartial Practical Reason
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(A) Kant, Groundwork.
-
(B) Foot, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives” and Brink,
“Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority, and Supremacy”.
14. Metaphysical Egoism
-
(A) Brink, “Self-love and Altruism”.
-
(B) Parfit, Reasons and Persons, part III.
15. Korsgaard on Normativity
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(A) Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, chs. 1-4.
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(B) The Sources of Normativity, chs. 5-9.