The Stoics, perhaps even more than the Epicureans, were explicit and self-conscious about offering a unified and systematic treatment of their philosophical views about logic, physics, and ethics. Cato, Cicero's Stoic spokesman, expresses considerable admiration for the systematicity of Stoic philosophy.
The remarkable coherence of the system and the extraordinary orderliness of the subject matter have made me prolix. Don't you find it amazing, in heavens name? ... What is there that is not so linked to something else that all would collapse if you moved a single letter? But there is nothing at all which can be moved [Cicero, De Fin iii 74].The Stoics want to fit their ethical theory into their overall world view. Like many Greeks, they think that ethical inquiry concerns the human good and that the human good involves living in accord with nature. They think that the cosmos is a goal-directed system and that individual organisms and natural events each have a distinctive role or function in this system. On this basis they argue that the demand that human good consists in a life according to nature implies that the good for an agent consists in performing her functions or characteristic activities well (De Fin iii 20-21/Hellenistic Philosophers 59D). Because the human function consists in rational activity, life according to nature (for us) is life according to reason or life according to virtue (DL vii 84-89; 63D,E,M). So far, the Stoics are in agreement with Aristotle and his appeal to the human function (ENi 7). They explicitly resist the Epicurean claim that an appeal to nature supports the life of pleasure, claiming that pleasure is valuable, if at all, only when it accompanies virtue (Diogenes Laertius vii 86; De Fin iii 17; 57A). But the Stoics also want to disagree with Aristotle's conclusions about eudaimonia; they think that the appeal to nature supports the identification of eudaimonia with virtue (80.89, 80.94). This identification implies that virtues are intrinsically as well as instrumentally valuable (DL vii 94, 97; 61A, 63A, C, H); in this, of course, the Stoics are agreeing with Plato and Aristotle, and rejecting the Epicurean commitment to the purely instrumental value of virtue.
VIRTUE
Given the Stoic identification of eudaimonia and virtue, one issue
that is obviously of central importance is the proper interpretation of
virtue. Stoic views here are surprisingly unclear. As with
Aristotle, the Stoics seem to accept what we might call a eudaimonic conception
of virtue according to which virtues are states of character that promote
the agent's good by exercising control by her rational part. But
the eudaimonic conception of virtue leaves it unclear whether familiar
other-regarding traits, including courage and justice, will turn out to
be genuine virtues.
Though there is disagreement over how many virtues there are, their identity, and (for those who recognize a plurality) their relative importance, the consensus view seems to include the following claims:
HAPPINESS, VIRTUE, AND EXTERNALS
Stobaeus reports that virtue is a proper part of happiness.
Of goods, some are virtues but others are not. Prudence, moderation, <justice> and courage are virtues; but joy, cheerfulness, confidence, well-wishing and the like are not virtues [60K].But this claim seems to be a Stoic outlier. The Stoics are commonly understood to identify happiness and virtue (DL vii 89; De Fin iii 20-39). They interpret virtue here to mean something like reaching the right or reasonable decision and acting on that decision; it is not taken to include various natural goods, including e-goods (see below). And because happiness and virtue are identical, the Stoics conclude that these goods are not genuine goods; their possession does not increase one's happiness, and their loss does not detract from one's happiness. This certainly sounds like a radical version of the Socratic paradox that virtue is sufficient for happiness (DL vii 127).
The virtues -- prudence, justice, courage, temperance, and the others -- are good; and their opposites -- imprudence, injustice, and the others -- are bad; neither good nor bad are those things which neither benefit nor harm, such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, good reputation, noble birth and their opposites death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, bad reputation, low birth and such things .... For these things are not good, but things indifferent in the category of preferred things [DL vii 102].The claim that these "goods" are preferred indifferents and not part of happiness is an indisputable feature of Stoic ethics (DL vii 102, 107; De Fin iii 22, 24; Sextus AM xi 61-63; 58B). In light of this, it seems we must adjust something in the Stoic claim that virtues of character include such "goods" (DL vii 90). There seem to be two options: (a) because this claim does not seem to be repeated elsewhere, we might dismiss it as aberrational, or (b) we might conclude that they mean to identify happiness with only the virtues of intellect. In what follows I shall assume (a).
What do they mean by saying that these "goods" are preferred indifferents? It might help to set out some of the claims they make about these issues.
Let's set aside for the moment the worries that (4b) and (4c) pose for the consistency of the Stoic claims about preferred indifferents and just consider (1). One worry about (1) is that there are externals unconnected with virtue that seem able to affect our happiness. This is Plato's and Aristotle's view, apparently required by Aristotle's completeness constraint. For example, the virtuous person's life is less choiceworthy and so less happy or valuable than it would otherwise be if he suffers excruciating pain on the rack (1153b17-21). The Stoics commit themselves to denying that e-goods unconnected with virtue are genuine benefits and that e-evils that are unconnected with virtue are genuine harms.
To benefit is to change or maintain something in accordance with virtue, while to harm is to benefit or maintain something in accordance with vice [DL vii 104].The question, of course, is why the Stoics should think this. The answer, I think, is that they believe that happiness must be within our control -- and not just largely within our control, as Aristotle believes, but fully within our control. If they accept this strong version of the control assumption, then they can and should reject the completeness constraint -- because a complete good is not within our control -- and the recognition of externals that completeness supports.
But what about externals that are connected with virtue? Virtue has got to have certain objects. Eudaimonism implies that all the virtues have as their ultimate aim or object the good of the agent, but they also have more immediate objects as well. For instance, magnificence has as its object certain kinds of benefits to others, and courage has as its object (at least sometimes) something like defending the community or the common good. Because virtue is supposed to be action in accordance with nature, we might call such objects of the virtues (e.g. benefiting others and the common good) natural goods. These natural goods are not only that at which virtuous activity aims at but also what it reliably secures, in the sense that virtuous activity is calculated to secure these goods in normal circumstances. But virtuous activity cannot infallibly secure these goods; other people may interfere with my actions, and other people may do things or natural processes may occur that undercut my production of the natural goods in question. The fact that virtuous activity does not infallibly secure these natural goods is further reason to distinguish virtuous activity and the natural goods at which that activity aims. But then we can ask: Aren't natural "goods" good? In particular, if virtue is good and it aims at natural goods -- indeed, natural goods help define virtuous activity -- shouldn't these things be classified as goods? The Stoics say No.
But here one must first remove a misunderstanding, so that no one might think that there are two highest goods. For just as, if it is someone's purpose to direct a spear or arrow at something, we say that his highest goal is to do everything he can in order to direct it at [the target], in the same sense that we say that our highest goal is a good. The archer in this comparison is to do all that he can to direct [his arrow at the target]; and yet doing all that he can to attain his purpose would be like the highest goal of the sort which we say is the highest good in life; actually striking [the target], though, is as it were to be selected and not chosen [De Fin iii 22].So the virtuous activity that aims at the natural good is good, but the natural good itself is a preferred indifferent.
Why should the Stoics think this? Isn't the achievement of the goal that guides one's activities and choices itself a good? Here, again they seem to be appealing to control. It is up to me and within my power to do what I can to reach the goal, but my actually securing the goal is not entirely up to me; it depends upon external factors. So I should not think of the goal itself as valuable or good.
But we should perhaps distinguish between the role of control in morality or moral assessment and in happiness. It seems quite reasonable to suppose that we should be held responsible, and be the subject of praise and blame, only for things that were within our control. After all, we don't call the archer a bad archer or blame her if a sudden gust of wind keeps the arrow from hitting the bulls-eye. So too, the Stoics might claim, we shouldn't be held accountable for failing to secure some goal if our failure is due to factors outside our control (e.g. the actions of others or natural forces); we should be held accountable only for doing our best to secure the right goals. And this might be good reason to exclude natural goods, as we have, from our specification of virtue and virtuous activity.
So far, so good. But it's not clear that control applies in the same way to our views about happiness or value. Why should we assume that a good life is fully within my control. Something seems to be a good just in case it's choiceworthy; Aristotle recognizes this in accepting completeness as a constraint on eudaimonia. But these natural goods and other externals do seem to be choiceworthy; a life that lacks them, but possesses virtue, may be a good life, but it is not lacking in nothing. It seems we get an even better whole by adding natural goods and other externals to virtue. As Plato and Aristotle recognize, completeness does not require us to give up the dominance of virtue or the claim that eudaimonia must be largely within our control; it requires only that we give up the claim that eudaimonia be completely within our control and that we recognize the value of various externals. This seems to be a reasonable ground for skepticism about the Stoic identification of eudaimonia with virtue.
JUSTICE
As part of the Greek eudaimonist tradition, the Stoics face the now
familiar question about how they can recognize other-regarding traits,
such as justice, as genuine virtues. Like Aristotle, they think that
justice aims at a common good, but, unlike Aristotle (and like Green),
they think that the scope of the common good should be universal, extending
to all members of humanity. The Stoics recognize that most of us
tend to think of our relations to others in terms of a set of concentric
circles, with ourselves in the innermost circle, and the remotest Mysian
in the outermost circle, and that, as a result, we tend to accept an interpersonal
discount rate of concern. Stobaeus reports the views of Hierocles.
Each one of us is as it were entirely encompassed by many circles, some smaller, others larger, the latter enclosing the former on the basis of their different and unequal dispositions relative to each other. The first and foremost circle is the one which a person has drawn as though around a centre, his own mind. ... Next, the second one further removed from the centre but enclosing the first circle; this contains parents, siblings, wife, and children. The third one has in it uncles and aunts, grandparents, nephews, nieces, and cousins. The next circle includes the other relatives, and this is followed by the circle of local residents, and then the circle of fellow tribesmen, next that of fellow citizens, and then in the same way the circle of people from neigbouring towns, and the circle of fellow countrymen. The outermost and largest circle, which encompasses all the rest, is that of the whole human race [57G].But the Stoics reject this sort of partiality as unjustified. They think that we should have equal regard for ourselves, our associates, and the remotest Mysian (De Fin ii 63; 57H). They counsel that we resist this interpersonal discount rate. The previous passage continues as follows.
Once these [concentric circles] have all been surveyed, it is the task of a well tempered man, in his proper treatment of each group, to draw the circles somehow toward the centre, and to keep zealously transferring those from the enclosing circles into the the enclosed ones .... It it incumbent on us to respect people from the third circle, as if they were those from the second, and again to respect our other relative as if they were from the third circle. ... The right point will be reached if, through our own initiative, we reduce the distance of the relationship with each person [57G].Indeed, Cicero represents the Stoics as concluding that the just person will sometimes have to favor the common good, so understood, to one's own good (De Fin iii 64). Here, the Stoics insist on other-regarding concern that is not only universal in scope, but also equal in the way it weights people's interests.
THE EUDAIMONIST DEFENSE OF JUSTICE
An obvious question is why the Stoics should think that the virtuous
person will have an equal regard for all humanity. Because they identify
human nature with reason, they think that we each have a natural affinity
for reason as such, wherever we find it in humanity.
Hence it follows that mutual attraction between men is also something natural. Consequently, the mere fact someone is a man makes it incumbent on another man not to regard him as alien. ... We are therefore by nature suited to form unions, societies, and states [De Fin iii 62-8].But this appeal to shared rationality will not provide a eudaimonist reason for adopting concern with wide scope, much less equal weight. For the eudaimonist claims that I have reason to promote my own eudaimonia, which depends upon my nature as a rational being. But then what I have reason to care about, in the first instance, is my rational agency. The fact that other people are also rational agents does not, without further argument, provide me with eudaimonist reason to care about them. In this respect, rationality is not so different from money. If what I have reason to do is to amass money, then I have reason to care about the size of my own bank account. It's true that your money is the same as my money and that I can recognize that we have a common interest in amassing money in the sense that you have the same sort of reason to amass money for yourself that I do to amass money for myself. But this common interest in money does not give me reason to help you amass money or increase the size of your bank account.
The Stoics need to show that our interests in rationality are common in a much stronger sense -- not just that they are parallel but that they are interdependent. They need to show that the proper development and exercise of my own rational faculties requires as a necessary condition or constituent part the development and exercise of your rational faculties. Aristotle's account of friendship and its relation to justice purports to do just this. As the Stoics and Green recognize, Aristotle himself does not recognize the universal scope of the common good. But, if Green is right, Aristotelian arguments might be able to meet this Stoic goal. Unfortunately, Stoic arguments do not come close.
JUSTICE AND DIVINE DESIGN
However, the Stoics might try to defend their strong claims about the
common good by appeal to their natural teleology, in particular, their
assumptions about divine design (cf. Cooper, "Eudaimonism, the Appeal to
Nature, and Moral Duty").
If you see a large and beautiful house, you could not be induced to think that it was built by mice and polecats, even if you do not see the master of the house. If, then, you were to think that the great ornament of the cosmos, the great variety and beauty of the heavenly bodies, the great power and vastness of the sea and land, were your own house and not that of the immortal gods, would you not seem to be downright crazy [Cicero, De Natura Deourm ii 17]?How might divine design help with the eudaimonist defense of justice?
Another question is whether (5) follows from (4). Perhaps I could accept (4) if I knew that our world is the product of divine design, that god has commanded justice, and that justice requires me to sacrifice my interests for the sake of another. Then I might be able to see this sacrifice as compensated, provided I interpret my own good in terms of my role in the best community. But I would have to know these things independently. Theodicy itself does not give me reason to believe that I should sacrifice for another. For the whole point of theodicy is to explain how the whole might be best even if things are not best for me (non-relationally) -- if I make what would otherwise appear to be sacrifices. But equally theodicy implies that the best whole may not be best for you (non-relationally). So I cannot conclude from the fact that the world is ordered for the best, that I have reason to care for you or to make sacrifices for your sake. If I knew that the best world did include my sacrifice for you, then I might be able to see this sacrifice as compensated (waiving the worry about (4)). But divine design does not itself imply this reason to care or sacrifice for you.
Of course, even if the argument were valid, it would still rest on the premise of divine design. As the Epicureans argue, the Stoics are too selective in their analysis of the evidence. If you're going to count beneficial processes as evidence of design, then you should count evil and harm as flaws in the design. If the former is going to be evidence of the omnipotence and benevolence of the designer, then the existence of moral evil and natural disasters should be evidence that the designer is either non-omnipotent or non-benevolent. This, of course, is the problem of evil, which the Epicureans press in reply to the Stoic argument from/for design.