Draft of 9-29-03
PHIL 13: Ethics
Fall 2003; UCSD
David O. Brink
Handout #1: Subjectivism and Realtivism

SUBJECTIVISM
Some subjectivist claims:

Subjectivism contrasts with objectivism or realism.  Realism about a domain claims that there are facts or truths in the domain that are in some sense prior to and independent of our beliefs or attitudes about them.  We acquire knowledge in that domain when our opinions reliably track the facts or truths in that domain.  Subjectivism denies that there are such objective facts; if there are facts and truths, they must somehow depend upon our beliefs or attitudes.

Moral realism is the claim that there are facts or truths about what is right and wrong that are prior to and independent of the beliefs and attitudes of appraisers.

Moral subjectivism denies that there are objective moral truths.  It claims that moral judgments involve noncognitive attitudes. Subjectivism is not the view that moral demands are relative to circumstances or that moral judgments are relative to non-moral belief.  The subjectivist thinks that moral judgments are only a matter of feeling.  We should distinguish two version of subjectivism.

Compare reporting your anger and saying or doing something that expresses your anger.  Consider the judgment: According to the descriptivist, I am saying Or perhaps According to the expressivist, I am expressing an attitude of disapproval toward the conduct in question. If we look for linguistic expressions of these attitudes, we might try the imperatival form. The Descriptivist thinks that moral judgments can be true or false; the Expressivist denies this.

THE TROUBLE WITH SUBJECTIVISM
If moral deliberation and judgment is to tell people what they should do, then it seems to presuppose moral standards that purport to be correct independently of one’s beliefs or attitudes.

Also, the linguistic form of moral judgments does not fit the subjectivist analysis. Unlike expressions of attitudes, moral judgments are assertive in form.  They ascribe properties to persons, actions, and institutions.  Unlike reports of the speaker’s attitudes, moral judgments do not refer to the appraiser or his internal states.

SUBJECTIVISM AND DISAGREEMENT
Subjectivists often appeal to the fact that there is such a diversity of moral opinion both within and especially across moral communities.  But convergence is not a precondition of objectivity.  There are plenty of disagreements about the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics and about basic facts of cosmology.  Creation scientists reject evolutionary theory.  Theists and atheists disagree.  Sometimes the disagreement is reasonable and sometimes it is not.

Also, we should be less inclined to question the objectivity of a domain to the extent that we can understand and explain lack of convergence.  And there are many such resources for the moral realist to explain lack of convergence.  One reason morality is contentious is that it often concerns matters of considerable personal and emotional importance, such as the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social and personal interaction.  It’s not hard to see how various factors – such as personal loyalties, self-interest, or ideological commitments – could be potential forms of distortion, interfering with one’s tendency to track moral facts reliably.

 In fact, moral disagreement actually undermines subjectivism.  Consider again:

If A endorses this claim and B rejects it, we have a moral disagreement.  But subjectivism does not explain this disagreement well.  Descriptivism implies that A and B are reporting that they have different attitudes.  That’s not a disagreement.  Expressivism claims that A and B are evincing different attitudes.  That’s not a disagreement.

RELATIVISM AND TOLERANCE
Realism might seem objectionable if it commits one to dogmatism and subjectivism may seem attractive if it underwrites tolerance.  The realist must think that his own moral beliefs are right and that his opponent’s are wrong.  But isn’t that dogmatism and doesn’t it breed intolerance?  By contrast, the implications of subjectivism might seem more reassuring.  If I am a subjectivist, I deny that there is a single true morality and insist that moral judgments merely report or express noncognitive attitudes.  But then I cannot regard my moral opinions as better or more correct than yours.  So I should be humble and have no reason to interfere with the moral beliefs and practices of others.

These arguments make several assumptions that are worth making explicit and addressing separately.

  1. It is good to be humble and non-dogmatic.
  2. It is good to be tolerant and bad to be intolerant.
  3. The subjectivist can explain (1) and (2).
  4. The realist cannot explain (1) and (2).
These assumptions are all questionable.  The realist can think that being humble and tolerant are objectively good.  In fact, it makes sense to be humble if you are a realist because then you believe that people are fallible.  Tolerance is possible because we need to distinguish the rightness of another’s conduct and the rightness of our interfering with another’s conduct.  B can act wrongly, and yet it can be wrong for A to interfere with B.  Because the subjectivist thinks that no moral judgments are objectively correct, it provides no basis for condemning dogmatic or intolerant outlooks.  Also, it’s not clear that a blanket requirement of tolerance is attractive.  Should we have tolerated the Nazis?  Should we tolerate compulsory female genital mutilation?