

The aim will be to master the central options and arguments in contemporary debates about free will. We will use as a starting point Michael McKenna and Dirk Pereboom's book, *Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction*. The reading for each week will be selected chapters from the book, together with selected further reading.

### **8 Jan: Introduction to and overview of the free will problem**

McKenna and Pereboom chapter 1 'Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Determinism'  
McKenna and Pereboom chapter 2 'The Free Will Problem'  
McKenna and Pereboom chapter 3 'Classical Compatibilism and Classical Incompatibilism'

### **15 Jan: (MLK day – class will be rescheduled) The consequence argument**

McKenna and Pereboom chapter 4 'The Debate over the Consequence Argument'  
Beebe, Helen and Mele, Alfred, 'Humean Compatibilism' *Mind*, 2002 (111): 201-33  
Ginet, Carl, 'Might We Have No Choice?', in Lehrer, Keith (ed.), *Freedom and Determinism*, New York: Random House, 1996: 87-104  
Van Inwagen, Peter, 'The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism', *Philosophical Studies*, 1975 (27): 185-99  
Vihvelin, Kadri, 'The Abilities and Dispositions of Our Freedom', in *Causes, Laws, & Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn't Matter*, New York: Oxford University Press (2013), chapter 6

### **22 Jan: Alternative Possibilities and Frankfurt Cases**

McKenna and Pereboom chapter 5 'Alternative Possibilities and Frankfurt Cases'  
Fischer, John Martin, 'The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories', *Philosophical Review*, 2010 (119): 315-36  
Fischer, John Martin, 'Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities', in *The Metaphysics of Free Will*, Oxford: Blackwell (1994)  
Frankfurt, Harry, 'Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility', *Journal of Philosophy*, 1969 (66) 829-39  
Ginet, Carl, 'In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don't Find Frankfurt's Argument Convincing', *Philosophical Perspectives*, 1996 (10): 403-17.  
Van Inwagen, Peter, 'What Our Not Having Free Will Would Mean', in *An Essay on Free Will*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1983) chapter 5

### **29 Jan: Strawson on Freedom and Resentment**

McKenna and Pereboom chapter 6 'Strawsonian Compatibilism'  
Strawson, PF, 'Freedom and Resentment'  
Russel, Paul, 'Strawson's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility', *Ethics*, 1992 (102): 287-302.  
Shabo, Seth, 'Where Love and Resentment Meet: Strawson's Interpersonal Defense of Compatibilism', *Philosophical Review*, 2012 (121): 95-124  
Watson, Gary, 'Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme', in Schoeman, Ferdinand (ed), *Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1987): 256-86.

Wolf, Susan, 'The Importance of Free Will', *Mind*, 1981 (90): 386-405

Allais, Lucy, 'Freedom and Forgiveness', Shoemaker, David and Tognazzini, Neal, (eds), *Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, 2: 'Freedom and Resentment' at 50*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

### **5 Feb: Source Incompatibilism**

McKenna and Pereboom chapter 7 'Three Source Incompatibilist Arguments'

Strawson, Galen, 'The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility', *Philosophical Studies*, 1994 (75): 5-24

Fischer, John Martin and Ravizza, Mark, 'The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism', in *Responsibility and Control: An Essay on Moral Responsibility*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998), chapter 7.

Pereboom, Derk, 'Problems for Compatibilism', in *Living Without Free Will*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2001), chapter 4.

McKenna, Michael, 'A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom's Four-case Argument', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (2008) 77(1): 142-59

### **12 Feb: Compatibilism**

McKenna and Pereboom chapter 8 'Contemporary Compatibilism: Seven Recent Views'

McKenna and Pereboom chapter 9 'Contemporary Compatibilism: Mesh Theories, Reasons-Responsive Theories, and Leeway Theories'

There are too many options for me to prescribe: choose three versions of compatibilism you find most interesting do to further reading on.

### **19 Feb (Presidents day – class will be rescheduled): Libertarianism**

McKenna and Pereboom chapter 10 'Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism'

There are too many options for me to prescribe: choose three versions you find most interesting do to further reading on.

### **26 Feb: Contemporary denials of determinism**

Cartwright, Nancy, *How the Laws of Physics Lie*

Dupre, John, *The Disorder of Things*, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1993

Dupre, John, 'Freedom of the Will', in *Human Nature and the Limits of Science*

### **5 March: Contemporary denials of determinism**

Steward, Helen, *A Metaphysics for Agency*

### **12 March: Free will scepticism**

McKenna and Pereboom chapter 11: 'Contemporary Incompatibilism: Skeptical views'

McKenna and Pereboom chapter 12: 'Revisionism and Some Remaining Issues'

There are too many options for me to prescribe: choose three versions you find most interesting do to further reading on.

## **Seminar Requirements and grading:**

### **1) Class participation**

Attendance and active participation in every class is required.

### **2) Weekly short writing assignments.**

Every week you should write one long paragraph (not more than a page) about the prescribed readings (and any other reading you would like to add), focusing on what you found most interesting/plausible/inspiring to do further research on or what you found most puzzling. These writing assignments are due on Sunday evening and must be distributed to the class. They will form a kick off point for seminar discussions. Handing these in will be worth 20 percent of your final mark.

### **3) One term paper.**

Approval of term paper topics is required before the end of week 8. The term paper is due in finals week. It will be worth 80 percent of your final mark.