Title: What is known and the limits of deductive inference

Abstract: We don't know everything that follows from what we know. We know (by seeing) that there are cookies in the jar, but we don't know (by seeing) that there is a world of physical objects external to our minds; we lack this knowledge even though the existence of cookies implies that there are physical objects external to our minds, and we might readily infer as much. The problem is to say why we know some of the things that follow from what we know, but not everything that follows. Failure to explain why there are principled limits on what we know motivates a range of skeptical arguments. Steve Yablo and Jonathan Schaffer both try to limit the reach of deductive inference by appeal to the idea that *what is known* is not just a proposition, but a *subject matter*. The turn to subject matters is of broad importance to epistemology, and suggestive of a real advance on the problem, but both Yablo's and Schaffer's attempts fail in significant ways. I introduce an Austinian account of what is known, and show that it has some advantages.